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STRUCTURAL DIFFERENCES AMONG FIRMS:
A POTE TIAL SOURCE OF COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE
INI THE APPLICATION OF 16YFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
Eric K. Clemons
Michael Row
The Wharton School
University of Pennsylvania

ABSTRACT
Information systems are seen as strategic business tools, frequently essential to a firm and
central to its competitive strategy.

Their importance is now acknowledged.

But information

technology -- equipment and services -- is available to all firms, and most applications can be
duplicated; often the copying firm enjoys the advantages of newer and better technology,
learns from the experience of the innovator, and offers comparable services at reduced costs.
When can an information system convey sustainable competitive advantage?

We believe that the benefits resulting from an innovative application of information technology
can be defended if:

o they are so closely tied to the strategy of the innovating firm that competitors do not
wish to copy them

o they exploit unique structural characteristics of the innovating firm -- aspects of vertical
integration, degree of diversification, or unique skills and resources -- so that competitors
do not benefit from copying them

We introduce here a model of the firm, based on value chain analysis, that highlights differences among firms; the model then guides the search for defensible opportunities for competitive advantage that exploits these differences.
1. INTRODUCTION

must be developed to match a threat from a com-

1.1 Strategic Necessity or Competitive Advantage

competitors often develop equivalent systems at

There is widespread and continuing interest in
information systems and their effects on business

about the same time, they seldom convey competitive advantage. Many applications we have examined in corporate finance, retail banking, and

strategy; there is particular interest in information

distribution systems have proved to be strategic

systems

that

can

convey

sustainable

petitor;

competitive

they are clearly

necessities.

But since

necessities (Clemons and Kimbrough 1987) despite

advantage for innovative and aggressive firms. But

our initial expectations to the contrary. Perhaps
the earliest example we have been able to locate of
a strategic technology not conveying advantage was

there is a growing realization that competitive
advantage may be more difficult and more elusive
than initial reports have led industry practitioners

the first battle involving armor plated warships:

Somehow the image of the Monitor and the

to expect.

Merrimack futilely slugging it out in an inconclusive
Our hypothesis, first presented at the 1986 Inter-

national

Conference

(Clemons

and

on

Kimbrough

Information
1986),

is

naval battle conveys precisely what we want;

Systems

that

neither

many

the

North

nor

the

South

gained

any

advantage from this innovation, at least in this first

strategic applications of information systems have
proved to be strategic necessities. Such systems

battle, yet it was immediately clear that the days of
traditional wooden warships were numbered.
1

Vitale (1986) extends this notion, suggesting that in

We have not seen in the MIS literature references

many cases the initial innovator may in fact place

to advantage protected through the third or fourth
means, yet these seem to us after some thought to

his firm in a disadvantaged position.

Where there

and if the innovating firm lacks any special skill in

be far more promising. And examples are available:
When American Airlines first introduced its travel
agent reservation system, no other major airline was

producing this necessity, it may actually find itself

willing to cooperate in its development. Each had a

in a weakened competitive position.

reason:

are no first mover effects to give advantage to the
innovator, if the innovation becomes a necessity,
To return to

our graphic image of naval battles, the South gained

TWA, for example, relied heavily on

no advantage from introducing the ironclad warship,

through-traffic originating in Europe, while Eastern
relied heavily on its shuttle services, which required

since the North matched it at the same time;

no reservations.1 This clearly is an example of an

however, given the South's more limited industrial
base, this new necessity further weakened her
military position.

innovation that competitors did not want to copy.

Competitors will not benefit from copying an
innovative application if its benefits do not derive

directly from the information systems, but rather

from ways in which the application exploits unique
resources possessed by the innovator but not by its
competitors. This in essence converts an untapped
comparative advantage of the innovating firm into a

1.2 Structural Differences Among Firms
We believe that structural differences among firms
produce a primary source of competitive advantage

through information technology; in fact, they form a
primary source of competitive advantage for any

competitive advantage; such advantages can be
defended because competitors lack the non-MIS
resources needed for duplication and often cannot

means through which this advantage is pursued.

readily obtain these resources.

Applications of information technology may convey

o Your competitors cannot duplicate your innova-

As an example, we consider the introduction of a
new financial instrument, such as the Cash Management Account (CMA) developed by Merrill Lynch in
the mid-1970s. The CMA involved a money market
account, a checking account, brokerage services, a
credit card, and a line of credit. This instrument

lion or, through constant improvement, you can

can be matched only by firms able to offer all

remain ahead of your competition

services; it can provide competitive advantage only

some advantage, assuming that they are good ideas

and that the marketplace will demand them. They
will convey sustainable advantage if any of the
following conditions is met:

to firms able to offer these services cost effectively.

o You have preempted the marketplace·, customers

will accept only one system and will not switch,

1.3 A Structural Model of the Firm

and the adoption of your system was so rapid
that there is simply no market left to compete

In the following section, we begin to develop a
structural model of the firm and we then use this

for by the time your competitors can act

to begin to see how organizations use information

o Competitors do not want to copy your innovation

technology. We find this useful for several reasons:
o Competitors cannot benefit from copying your
innovation

o as a motivator for finding opportunities to use
information technology effectively

Examples of sustainable advantage through the first
two means do exist, but they are far Iess common

o as an evaluator for determining areas in which

than a trusting first scan of the MIS literature

these applications are most likely to produce
significant benefits

would imply. After some thought, this is probably
not surprising:

it is difficult to keep an idea

secret; it is difficult to keep improving an idea
faster

than

competitors

not

tied

to

an

o perhaps most importantly, as a predictor of those

areas in which competitors can not readily or

older

technology; it is difficult to get a product adopted

effectively duplicate the benefits of an innova-

fast enough to preempt a market.

tive application
2

2. A STRUCTURAL MODEL OF THE FIRM

proved effective as an evaluator after the fact of

o managed interactions -- for example, in large,
geographically distributed manufacturers, where
production scheduling must be coordinated to
deliver work in process inventory where needed
while still reducing quantities; where individual
facilities must schedule production; where orders
from suppliers must be coordinated; and where

attempted applications and as a partial explanation
of observed effects.
We are convinced that

the entire process must ultimately be driven by
sales data and marketing information.
Not

Again, we introduce the following model of the firm
because it serves as an indicator of where to look
for promising uses of information technology and as
an evaluator of candidate applications; also, it has

differences among firms are likely to indicate where

surprisingly, this is related to the previous point;

Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) have shown that
increasing environmental complexity leads to
more complex interactions requirements

benefits of an information technology application
can be successfully retained by the innovating firm.

2.1 The Model Itself

Given these capabilities, we expect to see informa-

The model is based on the value chain,2 which
illustrates the production of a good or service as a
directed, attributed graph.
Nodes in the graph
represent activities performed to add value. Arcs

tion technology used in the following ways:

o to manage interactions within the firm, particu-

represent the flow of goods or information and are

larly those not handled by the firm's existing
hierarchical control structures

labeled with attributes that indicate what is flowing
in what volume.

o to manage interactions with organizations outside

the firm

Firms differ in their degree of vertical integration;
that is, they differ in how far they extend their
value chains. In this model, we represent industry
value chains, rather than value chains of individual
firms; thus, for less than fully integrated producers,

2.2.1 Managing vertical interactions

Information systems can be used to manage the
vertical interactions within a single value chain of a

the value chain for a product will be shown as a

sequence of value chains for suppliers, the manufacturer, distributors, and customers.

single firm, coordinating inventories, scheduling
production to meet demand, and permitting coordination and control of geographically dispersed
facilities. Information systems can also be used
within a single value chain, across the boundaries

Firms differ in their degree of diversification.
Firms that produce several goods or services will be
represented by multiple parallel value chains.

of a firm, where traditional hierarchical control
structures break down; these inter-organizational

2.2 The Role of Information Technology

Information

technology

has

always

done

information systems can facilitate sales, order entry,
and service and support functions.

the

following things well:

2.2.2 Managing horizontal interactions

o produced speed in communications, reducing
uncertainty or financial float

Information systems have proved especially effective

in managing the horizontal interactions within a

o handled large volumes of information

firm which cross the boundaries of individual
strategic business units; again, traditional hierarchical control structures have generally been insuffiThe benefits that result from facilitating
cient.

o managed complexity -- for example, in individual
Cash Management Accounts, where monthly

balances reflect the value of trades, net

these interactions frequently are generated by

portfolio effects, in which benefits result from
novel combinations, and economies of scope, in
which costs are reduced by combining related
functions from different business units.

commissions; the value of money market funds,
including deposits, withdrawals, sweep of idle
funds between trades, and interest earned; and
automatic debits to cover credit card balances

due

3

limited benefit to a less integrated manufacturer.
The manufacturer here has converted a potential,

2.2.3 Creating synergies

information

comparative advantage into a competitive one; the

technology is in the creation of synergies that
exploit portfolio effects. Firms can create new

manufacturer's unique position makes it impossible
for competitors to erode this advantage simply by

products, or can add value to existing products, by
leveraging the combination of business units in the
portfolio. Cash management accounts, mentioned
above, are an excellent example of creating a new
product, with real value to customers, by combining
offerings from several business units.

duplicating the information systems.

3. EXPLOITING DIFFERENCES AMONG FIRMS

advantages are real they are likely to be sustainable. But there are other strategies possible, and

Untapped differences among firms may be potential
or comparative advantages; they become competitive
advantages when firms find some way to exploit

some may be just as effective in exploiting another
firm's structural differences, converting them into
different, equally sustainable sources of competitive
advantage.

Perhaps

the

most

valuable

use

of

We expect the manufacturer in this example to do
well, as it in fact appears to be doing. Is it doing
better than all its competitors? Probably not. An
information system that exploits differences among
firms still yields only potential advantages. If these

them, developing a product or service that
customers will demand and that competitors cannot
readily match or cannot match at comparable prices.

4. USING THE MODEL IN THE SEARCH FOR
ADVANTAGE

Well conceived strategies can exploit differences
among firms such as manufacturing excellence,
differences in distribution networks, or differences
These are
in access to strategic resources.
competitive advantages that can be sustained, since
real structural differences among firms are not
readily eliminated.

We use the model just introduced to guide the
search for competitive opportunities in the following
areas:

o opportunities presented by differences in degree
of vertical integration

Information systems applications that exploit these
differences among firms similarly may yield sustain-

o opportunities presented
diversification

Unless the competitor can
able advantages.
somehow eliminate the comparative disadvantage of
his firm, copying the innovator's information system
will be of only limited value.

by

differences

o opportunities presented by differences
competence in a basic value-adding operation

in
in

As usual, even a single naive example should help

Additionally, though less directly, we find the model

to make these concepts clear. We consider here a
vertically integrated manufacturer of sweaters,

helpful in relating the search for opportunities to
the strategy pursued or niche occupied by a firm,

which manufactures and distributes sweaters and

when these can be a means of defending any

sells them through its own retail outlets.

The

competitive advantage derived.

We treat each of

these in more detail below.

manufacturer has an information system that
provides very timely and very accurate sales
information. It exploits this by maintaining very
limited finished goods inventory; instead, semiFor example, an
finished inventory is kept.
inventory of sweaters is kept finished but not yet
colored; they can then be dyed to meet demand,
rather than manufactured for inventory, and they
can be shipped where stock is needed, rather than
where demand is expected. Clearly, this reduces
cost and could not be done by a less integrated
manufacturer. Copying the sales information system
-- even copying the sales, manufacturing, inventory
control, and distribution systems -- would be of

4.1 Opportunities Resulting from Differences
Among Firms in Vertical Integration

Firms differ in their degree of vertical integration;

that is, their value chains are of different lengths,

reflecting which of their primary value-adding
activities they directly perform and which they
achieve by purchasing goods or services from other
firms.

o Xerox sells through an internal sales force, while
Savin sells through independent dealers. Links
4

to customers may benefit Xerox more than Savin,
while links to dealers may be more necessary for
Savin than for Xerox.

Motors manufactures more of the components in its
automobiles than either Ford or Chrysler, which

both out-source close to half the value of the
This captive
materials in their automobiles.

o Merrill Lynch has the largest "Main Street"

manufacturing capability, and its assured customer

distribution network of any Wall Street investment house. This may offer a unique distri-

demand, used to be a strategic advantage for GM.

bution channel for Merrill to move products
developed by their capital markets group;

nology to manage their relationships with suppliers,

Now, as Chrysler and Ford use information tech-

gaining assured quality, flexibility in service and
delivery, and the cost advantage that comes from
their suppliers' uniformly lower wage scales, GM's

alternatively, if other firms can develop elec-

tronic links directly to potential retail customers
for many types of trades, this may represent an

advantage has been converted into a disadvantage.3

enormous expense to Merrill not incurred by
their competitors.

4.2 Opportunities Resulting from Differences in
Degree of Diversification

The model highlights this class of differences among

firms, showing it as differences in the lengths of
firms' value chains and as differences in the arcs

Clearly, firms differ in the number of activities
,they pursue as well as in their degree of vertical
integration.
Unrelated diversification -- moving
into unrelated lines of business by acquiring firms- yields conglomerates. These were intended either

representing flow of goods, services, or information
along these chains. Not all differences will indicate
opportunities for information technology. Interfaces

-- those places where the value chain crosses the

to exploit managerial expertise of the holding

boundary between firms -- are especially promising

company or to
businesses with

as opportunities to exploit information technology to
manage interactions, reduce complexity, or reduce

reduce risk by entering into
uncorrelated cyclical behavior.

Recent evidence indicates that unrelated diversification produces firms with profitability less than
that of firms that diversified around some core area

uncertainty. Other possible important characteristics likely to indicate opportunities include the
technology of the activity, the volume of informa-

of competence (Rumelt 1982), and in this paper we

tion transmitted and the need for speed in moving
it, customer transaction costs, and alternative
mechanisms available for managing interactions.

will consider only related diversification.
o McKesson -- McKesson Corporation is a distri-

butor for several lines of products, among them
pharmaceuticals, liquor, and business forms.

Possible competitive uses include:

They would be expected to enjoy scope

o by-passing activities where you have a disadvan-

advantages when competing against firms in a
single line of business, particularly in the
development of software applicable to these
several lines.

tage; e.g., constructing an alternative distribution

channel, like an effective ATM network to
combat the lack of branches

o providing services that are more expensive for

o American Hospital Supply -- AHS enjoys an
advantage when competing against companies

competitors than they are for your firm

that distribute fewer lines of product; for the

customer, single source shopping greatly reduces
transaction costs.

Primary assets in the value chain are relatively
static, at least compared to introducing or dropping
software systems. Application systems are relatively
inexpensive, at least when compared to a network
of factories. Thus, differences among firms' value

o Allegi -- Real synergies should be available by
combining the different components of business

chains, if they offer opportunities for competitive

travel within a single firm: air travel, rental

advantage, generally offer opportunities for sustain-

cars, and hotels. It is already possible to return
your Hertz rental car, check your bags in for

able advantage.

your United flight, and receive your boarding

We offer one final example of strategic differences,
based on differences in value chains.

card.

Ultimately, you may be able to do this at

your Westin or Hilton International hotel.4

General

5

o Look at the activities currently considered

The model highlights differences in the breadth of a

Can the unique skills

firm's system of value chains, the potential for

essential in your industry.

interaction among them, and the strength of individual interactions. Again, the value of information

or technical infrastructure of your firm produce
improved means of performing these activities?
Can they be used to develop products or services

systems in exploiting the possibilities for interactions between business units will depend on the

difficult for competitors to match?

American

Airlines' skills in communications-based informa-

marketplace, the value chains, the business units,
and the overall structure of the firm. We believe

tion systems has led to improved systems for

that interactions among business units within a firm
frequently are not handled nearly as well today as

real-time control of aircraft schedules and of
The firm's existing
flight and cabin crews.

interactions within a single business unit; the latter
are generally handled by a firm's existing hierarchi-

reservation system was used as the basis for

cal control structure. Thus, facilitating interactions
is frequently an untapped potential resource. This,
of course, is the type of activity for which
information systems are especially appropriate.

to match as effectively, though of course they
have been duplicated by all major airlines.

frequent flyer programs difficult for competitors

4.4 Opportunities Resulting from Differences in
Strategy Pursued or Niche Occupied

Advantages may result from economies of scope by
combining different products of different value

centralized advertising or marketing research functions) to gain cost reductions and gain leverage

Strategy affects the importance of various links or
interactions, and thus the importance of information
systems to support them. A strategy of "design to
manufacture" requires close interactions between
product development and manufacturing (Rhein
A strategy of customer service requires
1986).

negotiating with suppliers.

close links between sales and the customer (Ives

chains to add value.

They may come from econ-

omies of scale by merging related functions within

different value chains (e.g., centralized purchasing,

They may come from

creating synergies, combining activities from several

and Learmonth 1984).

value chains to greatly increase the value of the

as the firm attempts to move "up scale" into more

resulting whole; full service financial institutions
Since
frequently attempt to accomplish this.

demanding and more expensive products.

acquiring

Comparing heavily discounted coach air fares with
full fare business class on trans-Atlantic flights, we

entire

business

units

is

costly,

time

consuming, and difficult, any strategic advantage

This last point is amplified

note that the business class ticket is frequently
four times as expensive; this may appear to be a
great deal of money to pay for free drinks. First
class may be twice again as expensive, but fully

that results from exploiting portfolio differences
among firms is likely to be sustainable.

reclining sleeper seats and labor-intensive service

4.3 Opportunities Resulting from Differences in

make this costly for the airline as well.

Competence in a Primary Value-Adding Activity

SAS

decided years ago to focus on the profitable, full
fare business class traveler; ideally, they envisioned

Look for activities that figure prominently in your
value chain, either internally, within the firm, or

a plane made up almost entirely of business class
sections.

externally, relating to customers and suppliers.

o Are there activities that you perform poorly

Servicing demanding business class travelers to

where improvement is likely to be significant?

Europe and within Europe would benefit from the
following:

Can information technology yield this improvement, either by facilitating your current valueadding

activity

Information

or

systems

by-passing

can

it

reduce

o Check-in and baggage pick-up at your SAS hotel
rather than at airport counters

entirely?

costs

by

facilitating inventory and distribution functions.
They can improve service by allowing customers

o Baggage claim at your SAS hotel rather than at
airport baggage counters

to enter their own orders, to initiate their own
transactions, or to perform some of their own
services.

o Easy, reliable limousine service between your
SAS hotels and the airport
6

o In-flight electronic mail to link you to your

American Airlines' reservation system certainly has
been a source of competitive advantage for the

office

airline; it is perhaps the best example we know of
sustainable competitive advantage through informa-

o Hotel based electronic mail to link you to your
office

tion technology.5

Chrysler's and Ford's use of

different strategies would have no reason to copy

information technology to manage relationships with
suppliers, mentioned above, is an example of
information technology used to reduce or eliminate

the information systems.

a disadvantage faced by the innovating firm;

Much of this is now realized.

Competitors with

This approach seems to

have yielded SAS a comparative advantage.

The

similarly, CitiBank's early introduction of ATMs to

complexity of this type of analysis is unfortunately
clear: is this comparative advantage a competitive

quality of their customer service had some measure

respond to the impact of lengthy lines on the

advantage, producing higher profits? We cannot yet

of this function as well.
American Airlines'
reservation system is well integrated with their
frequent flyer program, so that on crowded f'lights

tell.

preferred travelers can be given complimentary

5. MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS

upgrades if seats are available. Some other airlines,
lacking this integration, did not know who their

As we have noted previously (Clemons 1986;
Clemons and Kimbrough 1986) major shocks and

frequent flyers were until after the f'lights; some

discontinuities yield strategic opportunities.

frequent flyers the right to a free upgrade at the

have responded to American's ability by giving

Often

time reservations are made, and this probably has
an impact on their ability to sell these more
expensive seats.
Probably this represents not an

these weaken the comparative advantage of existing
dominant players in the marketplace and open
opportunities for alert, aggressive competitors with
different sets of skills and different potential or

advantage for American but a disadvantage for some

comparative advantages. Deregulation, change in
the price of strategic resources, change in customer

of their competitors.

preferences,

We believe that looking at the totality of a firm is

and

entry

of

new

international

important.
An approach that examines only
individual business units will miss many opportunities, particularly the most promising ones

competitors are among the most frequent marketplace discontinuities encountered.

Sometimes the response to the discontinuity will
rely heavily on information technology, as when
United Airlines successfully contested Frontier for
control of Denver's Stapleton Airport. On other
occasions, the victorious firm will rely on other

generated by information technology's ability to
integrate across business units.
We

strongly

believe

that,

in

the

absence

of

differences among firms, innovative uses of information technology will frequently be duplicated.6 Even
if the innovations were good ideas, they are likely

technologies, as when Japanese automobile manufacturers successfully contested United States manufac-

turers for a share of the domestic United States

to end up as strategic necessities rather than as

The model introduced above

sources of competitive advantage for the innovating
firm.

automobile market.

should be a useful tool in determining when the

opportunity generated by a major discontinuity can

in fact be an opportunity to use information

6. CONCLUSIONS

technology.

Information systems are seen as strategic business
tools.

Information technology can be used competitively in
the following ways:

We have found little firm evidence that they

have conveyed competitive advantage in any but a
few instances, despite our initial expectations; after
some analysis, this is less surprising:

o to create an advantage for the innovating firm

o to reduce a disadvantage that the firm currently

o Information technology -- equipment, software,

faces

services, and personnel --is available to all
firms. While these resources may be expensive
for small firms competing where scale economies

o to create a disadvantage for a competitor
7

exist, they are seldom prohibitively expensive for
major players of comparable size

look at interaction effects across the portfolio of a
firm's business units.

o Often the innovator is at a slight disadvantage
with his initial application. Later entrants often
benefit from his experience, duplicate his system
with newer technology and newer software
architecture, and offer comparable services at
lower costs.
There is evidence that learning
between firms is accomplished very quickly and

And thanks are due to our Jones Center colleague,

Steven Kimbrough, for many useful discussions while
developing the ideas presented here.
ENDNOTES

that copying firms enjoy significantly lower

1 The discussion of airline reservation systems
benefitted greatly from private conversations with

costs.

Professor Richard Meyer of the Harvard Business

School.
It is still possible to defend advantages from first
mover effects, if customer adoption is very rapid,
competitor response is relatively slow, and
customers face real switching costs.
This does
occur,

but it

has

been

far

less common

2 Numerous references exist.

Several authors have

introduces their own versions of the value chain;
perhaps the most popular one today is due to
Michael Porter (1985).

than

3 This is at least partly acknowledged even by

expected.

General Motors.
We believe that the benefits resulting from an

Roger Smith, Chairman of GM,

o they are so closely tied to the strategy of the

recently admitted that their degree of vertical
integration had ceased to be an advantage. "What
had been an advantage for us turned out to be a
semi-disadvantage," he says (Hampton and Norman
1987).

innovating firm that competitors do not wish to
copy them

4 Recent events have made it quite clear that Wall

innovative application of information technology can
be more readily defended if:

Street is not nearly as impressed with this strategy
as the authors of this paper.

o they exploit unique structural characteristics of
the innovating firm so that competitors do not
benefit from copying them

5 For a detailed analysis of competitive advantage
through reservation systems, see earlier papers by
Clemons (1986) and Clemons and Kimbrough (1986,
1987).

The model of the firm introduced here highlights
significant differences among firms to suggest
opportunities that may be exploited and defended.
It also indicates which of these are likely to be
opportunities for application of information tech-

See these papers also for an extensive list

of references.

6 This has been observed extensively in financial
services, including brokerage and trading services,
commercial banking, and retail banking. It also

nology.

appears to be true in many of the most frequently
As the model presented here is extended and
supported through additional field studies, it should

cited examples of strategic distribution systems.
See Clemons and Kimbrough (1986, 1987) for
supporting data, including published reports and the
results of site visits.

prove to be a useful tool.
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